Greg Detre
@10 on Tuesday, 17 October, 2000
try to give reductive or constructive explanations of how content arises:
anti-reductionist views of content as going with consciousness which is a primitive phenomenon
information theoretic accounts of content
�functional� or �conceptual role� theories of content
is intentionality (or �aboutness�) necessary for a state to be mental?
no, because we have counter-examples, e.g. sensations like red spots in front of your eyes or buzzing in your ear
is intentionality (or �aboutness�) sufficient for a state to be mental?
no, because there are many things with intentionality which aren�t mental, e.g. sentences in natural language (all have meaning, and aboutness)
though maybe mental states have some sort of underlying intentionality
The Rice(man/er???) programme
is consciousness the essence of mentality?
consciousness = �something it is like to be in that state�
current vs dispositional vs paradigm mental states???
dispositional mental state = can be brought to consciousness/awareness, e.g. beliefs/desires/intentions are included in mental states because they can be brought to mind
current = mental state now???
paradigm mental state, e.g. visual sensation
consciousness = admits non-inferential first-person access (i.e. I can effortlessly access the state)
how can a state that is not 1st person accessible be mental?
(what about other people�s states???)
unconscious or repressed states can be brought into consciousness, but they�re being blocked
they play a major causal role in folk psychology